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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a district court order granting a 
Motion for Summary Judgment for the defendant from the Third 
District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah on April 22, 
1992. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to U.C.A. §78-2a-3(2) 
(J). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES, RULES. AND REGULATIONS 
The following rules are essential to the determination of 
this appeal: 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 56(c) states in pertinent 
part: 
. . . The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith 
if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file together with 
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party 
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. . . 
Utah Rules of Evidence Rule 407 states that: 
When, after an event, measures are taken which, if 
taken previously, would have made the event less likely 
to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures is not 
admissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct in 
connection with the event. This rule does not require 
the exclusion of evidence of subsequent measures when 
offered for another purpose, such as proving ownership, 
control, or feasibility of precautionary measures, if 
controverted, or impeachment. 
1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
The defendant is in agreement with the plaintiff's 
statements concerning the nature of the case with one exception. 
The plaintiff alleges that she "sustained permanent and disabling 
injuries due to smoke inhalation from the fire, medical expenses 
that exceeded $50,000, and was left with a significant degree of 
permanent disability from the fire." Appellant's Brief page 4. 
The defendant is not in agreement with the plaintiff's statements 
concerning her permanent disability resulting from the fire and 
the medical expenses allegedly exceeding $50,000. Therefore, the 
defendant disputes such statements made by the plaintiff 
concerning the nature of the case. Further, the Court should 
note that the defendant is a non-profit corporation originally 
created by several school districts. The defendant was created, 
and Wasatch Manor built, as an apartment building to be used by 
retired teachers. Subsequently, the defendant accepted tenants 
who were not retired teachers. However, the defendant remains a 
non-profit corporation, providing housing for retired, semi-
retired and elderly people who can care for themselves and are 
ambulatory. 
B. Course of the Proceedings and Disposition 
The defendant agrees with the plaintiff's statements 
concerning the course of the proceedings and the disposition at 
2 
the trial court level with one exception. The plaintiff alleges 
that "due to difficulty in obtaining expert testimony as to the 
degree to which sprinklers would have been effective in limiting 
the spread of the fire at Wasatch Manor, Schreiter moved to 
continue trial of the case approximately one month before the 
trial date and before the defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 
was filed." Appellant's Brief page 5. The defendant disputes 
this statement. 
The plaintiff had known since prior to the time her 
complaint was filed in November 1990, that she needed a fire 
sprinkler system expert witness. Rec. at 13 0. The expert 
witness designation cutoff date was set, at plaintiff's request 
to expedite the case due to plaintiff's age, for August 31, 1991. 
Plaintiff's counsel did not designate any fire sprinkler system 
expert in his list of expert witnesses served on August 30, 1991. 
Rec. at 60-61. Nor did plaintiff's counsel move to supplement 
plaintiff's designation of expert witnesses after receiving 
defense counsel's list of expert witnesses on August 30, 1991, 
which included a fire sprinkler system expert. Rec. at 58. 
Plaintiff's counsel did not move to supplement plaintiff's expert 
witness list to add a fire sprinkler system expert until six 
months later and immediately prior to the final scheduling 
conference. The Court granted the plaintiff leave to amend the 
expert witness designation list, prepare a fire sprinkler system 
expert and have him deposed prior to April 17, 19 92. Rec. at 
3 
128. Trial was set to commence on May 11, 1992. Plaintiff's 
counsel did not do so. 
Ironically, the plaintiff is now stating that it was due to 
her difficulty in obtaining expert testimony that she was unable 
to designate a fire sprinkler system expert. The plaintiff had 
more than adequate time to obtain expert testimony concerning the 
degree to which sprinklers would have been effective in limiting 
the spread of the fire at Wasatch Manor. The plaintiff 
designated, timely, expert witnesses in the area of building 
codes, fire investigation and health care. Rec. at 58. The 
plaintiff had a number of resources to obtain a fire sprinkler 
system expert. The affidavit of the defendant's fire sprinkler 
system expert witness, William Pickett, states that there are 
twenty businesses or individuals qualified in Salt Lake County, 
alone, to provide cost estimates for sprinkler systems. Rec. at 
363, [Affidavit of William Pickett, 12:12-14]. Plaintiff could 
have retained anyone of them at anytime before filing suit, 
before designating expert witnesses, before the discovery cut-off 
date, or when granted additional time to designate a fire 
sprinkler system expert. Therefore, the defendant disputes the 
plaintiff's statement concerning the difficulty of obtaining a 
fire sprinkler system expert. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
It is undisputed that the defendant's building met or 
exceeded the building code at the time of construction. It is 
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further undisputed that the defendant's building passed all 
inspections made by the fire department between the time of 
completion and the time of the fire. With these facts, the 
burden was on the plaintiff to establish that a reasonable and 
prudent building owner, who has complied with applicable building 
and fire codes, still would install a fire sprinkling system. 
This requires the plaintiff to produce evidence of; (1) the cost 
of installing a fire sprinkler system in defendant's building; 
and (2) the ability of the defendant to pay such costs. 
Inability to prove these two elements prevents the plaintiff from 
establishing a prima facie case. Therefore, the Court's order 
granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant, for no cause 
of action, was proper and should be affirmed by this Court. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I, 
THERE ARE NO GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT AND THE 
PLAINTIFF CANNOT PROVE A PRIMA FACIE CASE OF NEGLIGENCE 
AGAINST THE DEFENDANT. THEREFORE, DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD BE AFFIRMED AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
The standard which applies to motions for summary judgment 
are stated in Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 
56 basically states that "a motion for summary judgment should be 
granted only if the pleadings, depositions, admissions and 
affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law." Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434, 436 (Utah 
1982). Where no material fact remains at issue, the Utah Court 
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of Appeals reviews the trial court's conclusions of law for 
correctness. Dybowski v. Ernest W. Hahn, Inc., 775 P.2d 445, 446 
(Utah App. 1989) . 
If the undisputed material facts show that the plaintiff 
cannot prove a prima facie case at the time the defendant files 
it's motion for summary judgment, then the motion for summary-
judgment must be granted. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 91 
L.Ed.2d 265, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby 
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 91 L.Ed.2d 202, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (1986). In 
Celotex, the Court stated that: 
[t]here can be no genuine issue as to any material 
fact, since a complete failure of proof concerning an 
essential element of the nonmoving party's case 
necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. The 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law because the nonmoving party has failed to make a 
sufficient showing on an essential element of her case 
with respect to which she has the burden of proof. The 
standard for granting summary judgment mirrors the 
standard for a directed verdict under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 50(a) . . . 
Id. at 477 U.S. 323. 
In the case at bar, plaintiff has not fulfilled her burden 
of proving a prima facie case of negligence against the 
defendant. In Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d 723, 726 (Utah 1985), 
the Court set out the standard for proving a prima facie case of 
negligence. The plaintiff must show: 
(1) a duty of reasonable care owed by the defendant to 
plaintiff; (2) breach of that duty; (3) the causation, 
both actually and proximately, of injury; and (4) the 
suffering of damages by the plaintiff. 
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In our case, the plaintiff has not shown the second element 
of the standard. The plaintiff has not shown a breach of a duty 
owed by the defendant. 
The plaintiff has cited cases that stand for the proposition 
that "summary judgment is reserved for only the most clear cut 
negligence cases." Although it is true that most negligence 
actions are questions of fact resolved by the fact finder, "it 
would be a mistake to conclude summary judgment is never 
appropriate in a negligence action." Adams v. Union Carbide 
Corp., 737 F.2d 1453 (6th Cir. 1984) (citing to Crolev v. Matson 
Navigation Co., 434 F.2d 73 (5th Cir. 1970). Crolev, and other 
decisions provide ample authority for the use of summary judgment 
in negligence cases. See, e.g., Gracyalny v. Westinghouse 
Electric Corp., 723 F.2d 1311, 1316 (7th Cir. 1983) ("a grant of 
summary judgment may be affirmed on any ground that finds support 
in the record"); Bryant v. Technical Research Co., 654 F.2d 1337 
(9th Cir. 1981); Aetna v. Loveland Gas & Electric, 369 F.2d 648 
(6th Cir. 1966); Millhouse v. General Tire & Rubber, 459 N.E.2d 
623 (Ohio App. 1983). 
In Davis v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 525 F.2d 1204 (5th Cir. 
1976), a motion for summary judgment was held properly granted to 
a defendant insurer in an action by any employee, injured while 
operating a machine on the job, for negligent inspection, when 
the plaintiff was unable to demonstrate the necessary elements of 
such a cause of action. Like Davis, the plaintiff in our case 
has not been able to prove a prima facie case of negligence 
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against the defendant and therefore, this Court should affirm the 
trial court's order granting a motion for summary judgment in 
favor of the defendant, as a matter of law. 
POINT II. 
WITHOUT A FIRE SPRINKLER SYSTEM EXPERT PLAINTIFF CANNOT PROVE 
A PRIMA FACIE CASE OF NEGLIGENCE AGAINST THE DEFENDANT. 
It is undisputed that the defendant did not violate any fire 
or building codes at the time the building was built, or at the 
time of the fire, by failing to have a fire sprinkler system in 
place in the building. Rec. at 161. Previously, the fact that 
the defendant's building met the fire and building codes wou1d 
have provided a basis for granting a motion for summary judgment. 
However, the Utah Supreme Court in Williams v. Melby, supra, held 
that a plaintiff may attempt to show that a reasonable and 
prudent person would have done more than the building code 
required. 
In the case at bar, in order for the plaintiff to show that 
it was reasonable and prudent for the defendant to have installed 
a fire sprinkler system in it's building prior to the fire, the 
plaintiff must show, at a minimum: 1.) the cost of designing, 
constructing and installing the fire sprinkler system; 2.) the 
ability of the defendant to pay for this expense; and 3.) that a 
reasonable and prudent building owner would have incurred the 
expense. Without a fire sprinkler system expert witness, the 
plaintiff cannot show these elements of proof essential to her 
prima facie case. Like a plaintiff in a medical malpractice case 
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where expert witness testimony is critical, so to is a fire 
sprinkler system expert critical to the plaintiff's case at bar. 
Failure to produce expert witness testimony in a medical 
malpractice case, prior to trial, provides the Court with a 
sufficient basis for granting a motion for summary judgment. 
See, Jennings v. Stoker, 652 P.2d 912, 914 (Utah 1980); Nixdorf 
v. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348, 352 (Utah 1980); and Marsh v. Pemberton, 
10 P.2d 40, 44-45 (Utah 1959). Plaintiff's failure to produce 
expert testimony on the fire sprinkler system bars here, as well. 
POINT III, 
PLAINTIFF HAS NOT SUBMITTED ANY ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE TO 
SHOW THE COST OR DEFENDANT IS ABILITY TO PAY FOR THE COST 
OF INSTALLING A FIRE SPRINKLER SYSTEM IN DEFENDANTS BUILDING, 
The only evidence plaintiff had with respect to the cost of 
installing a fire sprinkler system in the defendant's building 
was the testimony of Burton Miller, the manager of Wasatch Manor. 
Rec. at 484. During a discovery deposition, Mr. Miller testified 
that after the fire, defendant obtained a general estimate in the 
amount of $185,000 to $200,000 as the cost of installing a fire 
sprinkler system in the defendant's building. The plaintiff had 
no other evidence of the cost of installing a fire sprinkler 
system. The defendant objected to the use of such testimony 
pursuant to Rule 407, Utah Rules of Evidence, as inadmissible, 
and it was excluded as a subsequent remedial measure by the trial 
court. Rule 407 states that: 
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When, after an event, measures are taken which, if 
taken previously, would have made the event less likely 
to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures is not 
admissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct in 
connection with the event. This rule does not require 
the exclusion of evidence of subsequent measures when 
offered for another purpose, such as proving ownership, 
control, or feasibility of precautionary measures, if 
controverted, or impeachment. (Emphasis added). 
The plaintiff alleges that the Court erred in excluding such 
evidence as subsequent remedial measures for two reasons. First, 
the plaintiff alleges that obtaining the estimate for the 
installation of the fire sprinkler system was not a "subsequent 
remedial measure" as contemplated under Rule 407. Plaintiff 
claims that, by itself, the estimate is not a measure taken after 
the fire which, if obtained before February 7, 1990, would have 
made the fire less likely. Second, the plaintiff alleges that it 
was clearly error for the Court to rule that the "feasibility 
exemption [under Rule 407] applies only if there is an issue as 
to whether or not the fire sprinkler system physically can be 
installed." The plaintiff argues that the clear language of Rule 
407 does not limit the scope of the feasibility exemption in any 
such manner, citing Reese v. Mercury Marine Division of Brunswick 
Corp., 793 F.2d 1416, 1428 (5th Cir. 1986), reh'q denied, 797 
F.2d 977 (5th Cir. 1986) . 
Looking at the plain language of Rule 407, it is clear that 
Mr. Miller's testimony concerning the general estimate of 
installing a fire sprinkler system, after the fire, was a 
measure taken after an event which, if taken previously, might 
have made the event less likely to occur. Both parties 
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stipulated, for the purpose of defendant's motion for summary 
judgment, that if a fire sprinkler system had been installed in 
the defendant's building, that the fire would have extinguished 
before reaching the plaintiff. 
The plaintiff's main argument lies with the feasibility 
exemption under Rule 407. Rule 407 does not require the 
exclusion of subsequent measures when offered for another purpose 
such as the feasibility of precautionary measures, i_f 
controverted. However, the exception permitting the 
admissibility of evidence of subsequent remedial measures to 
prove the feasibility of such precautionary measures is permitted 
only if feasibility is controverted by the opposing party. 
Werner v. Upjohn Co., Inc., 628 F.2d 848, 853 (1980), cert, 
denied, 449 U.S. 1080 (1981) . The Advisory Committee notes to 
the Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 407, states that "unless a 
genuine issue of feasibility is present, the exception should not 
apply." Id. at 855. In other words, feasibility is not in issue 
unless controverted by the opposing party. Id. 
In the case at bar, the defendant conceded that a fire 
sprinkler system would have been an effective precautionary 
measure which, physically, could have been installed, and agreed 
to limit the scope of the motion for summary judgment solely to 
the question of whether the plaintiff had presented a prima facie 
case. Therefore, the feasibility of installing a fire sprinkler 
system in the defendant's building was not controverted and thus 
did not raise an issue of feasibility as required by Rule 407. 
11 
Plaintiff cites Reese v. Mercury Marine Division of 
Brunswick Corp., supra, for the proposition that the meaning of 
11
 feasibility" is not limited in the manner described by the 
defendant. Reese involved a wrongful death action brought 
against a manufacturer of outboard motors. In Reese the Court 
found that the appellant's suggestion during trial that only the 
retailer could properly instruct the ultimate consumer regarding 
the use of a kill switch on an outboard motor clearly 
controverted the utility and likelihood of success of the direct 
manufacturer warnings in its owner's manual. Thus, the Court 
concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in 
overruling the appellant's Rule 407 objection. Id. The decision 
in Reese, in fact, supports the defendant's exact proposition 
that the feasibility of precautionary measures must be 
controverted to be admissible. 
The testimony of Mr. Miller does not fall within the 
feasibility exemption to Rule 407. Rule 407 evidences a strong 
public policy in favor of encouraging tortfeasors to review the 
circumstances surrounding an accident to determine whether or not 
something could be done to prevent further accidents from 
happening. Werner at 855. This public policy requires the 
exclusion of evidence of subsequent remedial measures undertaken 
by the tortfeasor, unless the activity falls within one of the 
listed exemptions. In our case, the efforts of the defendant in 
obtaining an estimate on the installation of a fire sprinkler 
system is subsequent remedial conduct that does not fall within 
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any of the exceptions listed in Rule 407. Therefore, it is 
clear that the trial court did not err in excluding such 
testimony as a subsequent remedial measure pursuant to Rule 407 , 
and this Court should affirm the trial court's ruling on this 
issue. 
The plaintiff also alleges that the trial court similarly 
erred when it required plaintiff to show, as part of its prima 
facie case, that the defendant had the ability to pay for the 
cost of installing a fire sprinkler system in the defendant's 
building. The plaintiff's rationale for this argument is that if 
the defendant felt that it was financially unable to provide a 
fire sprinkler system in it's building, that such an argument was 
a defense that the defendant bears the burden of presenting and 
proving. In addition, the plaintiff argues that because the 
question of what financial resources are available to the 
defendant is within his exclusive control, the defendant, rather 
than the plaintiff, bears the burden of providing such evidence. 
The defendant's financial position is not in the defendant's 
exclusive control. Such information can be obtained through the 
use of the discovery process. The plaintiff failed to request 
this information from the defendant during fifteen months of the 
discovery period in this case. 
The plaintiff's arguments are fatally flawed. As stated 
earlier in this brief, in order to prove a prima facie case of 
negligence against the defendant, the plaintiff must show, as an 
element of her proof, the cost of installing the fire sprinkler 
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system in the defendant's building; the ability of the defendant 
to pay those costs; and that a reasonable and prudent building 
owner would have incurred these costs. The defendant's building 
met the building code when built, and passed all subsequent 
inspections by the Fire Marshall. No code, statute or regulation 
required the defendant to install a fire sprinkling system. 
Therefore, plaintiff must prove in her prima facie case that a 
reasonable and prudent landlord in defendant's position would 
have installed a fire sprinkling system. This is a classic 
example of the risk/benefit analysis. The plaintiff did not have 
this proof after all discovery had been completed and dispositive 
motions were heard. 
The only purported evidence of the defendant's ability to 
pay for the cost of installing the fire sprinkler system was that 
the defendant remodeled the building in 19 84 at the approximate 
cost of $500,000. This remodeling was, in fact, an enveloping of 
the building to reduce heat loss in order to decrease heating 
costs and repair the roof. This evidence, by itself, is 
insufficient as a matter of law, to show the defendant's ability 
to pay for a fire sprinkler system in the six years prior to 
February 7, 1990. The plaintiff argued in briefs and at oral 
argument that the majority of the defendant's tenants are elderly 
people. Burton Miller, the defendant's building manager, 
testified that most were retired and on fixed incomes. This 
latter fact, Mr. Miller said, placed limitations on the 
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defendant's (a non-profit corporation) ability to raise rent and 
to pay for improvements. 
The plaintiff did not produce any admissible evidence on the 
defendant's ability to pay for the cost of installing a fire 
sprinkler system in the defendant's building. therefore, the 
plaintiff could not prove, at the time of the motion for summary 
judgment, this portion of her prima facie case, and the trial 
court's order granting summary judgment in defendant's favor 
should be affirmed accordingly by this Court. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's order granting the defendant's motion for 
summary judgment was correct. The plaintiff has not established 
a prima facie case of negligence against the defendant. In order 
to prove a prima facie case of negligence against the defendant, 
the plaintiff must show, as an element of her proof, the cost of 
installing a fire sprinkler system and, separately, the ability 
of the defendant to pay such costs. Failure to prove either fact 
prevents the plaintiff from establishing a prima facie case. The 
plaintiff has not presented sufficient evidence to prove the 
required elements of a prima facie case against the defendant. 
Therefore, the defendant respectfully submits that the 
defendant's motion for summary be affirmed by this Court as a 
matter of law. 
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